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I.    INTRODUCTION 
 On June 2, 2014, the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) announced the Clean Power Plan (CPP), an adminis-
trative rulemaking with the goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from stationary electrical generating units (EGUs).1 The 
United States has made progress in reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions (10% below 2005 levels)2 but is still far from President Obama’s 
earlier pledge to reduce GHG emissions to 17% below 2005 levels by 
2020.3 However, by implementing the CPP, the United States should 
                                                                                                                                       
 This Note was selected for presentation at the FSU College of Law’s Environmental, Land 
Use, and Energy Law 2015 Colloquium. I would like to thank the faculty for selecting this 
paper and the other students for their excellent presentations. 
 J.D. 2015, Florida State University College of Law, cum laude, Certificate in Environ-
mental, Land Use, and Energy Law. I would like to thank Professor Shi-Ling Hsu for sug-
gesting this topic and providing valuable insight as well as the rest of the Environmental 
Law Faculty for their input. 
 1. Carbon Pollution Emissions Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Emissions  
Guidelines]. 
 2. JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43572, EPA’S PROPOSED 
GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATIONS FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS: FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS 3 (2014) [hereinafter EPA FAQ]. 
 3. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT ’S CLIMATE ACTION 
PLAN (2013),  available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/  
president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.  The President modified these goals in a recent 
agreement with China: the United States will decrease emissions by 26% to 28% of 2005 
levels, and China will reach peak emissions levels in 2030 and generate 20% of its electrici-
ty from solar and wind. Mark Landler, U.S. and China Reach Climate Accord After Months 
of Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/world/asia/ 
china-us-xi-obama-apec.html?_r=0. 
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surpass that goal. CPP’s end goal is to reduce emissions by 26% to 
30% of 2005 levels by 2030.4 The EPA has economically quantified 
the public health and environmental benefits of the projected emis-
sions reductions to be between $23 billion and $59 billion, with a 3% 
discount rate.5 Additionally, the economic benefits of the rule should 
amount to $30 billion in 2030.6  
 However, the EPA faces hurdles ahead in meeting its goals, in-
cluding delegating the implementation of the CPP to states, some of 
which have expressed hostility to GHG regulation.7 Florida and other 
states should consider implementing a carbon tax to meet their goals 
under the CPP. As I argue later in this Note, the use of a carbon tax 
takes advantage of the flexibility the EPA has afforded states 
through the CPP. Additionally, a carbon tax may be the only econom-
ically efficient method Florida has to reduce emissions in light of re-
cent decisions regarding renewable energy incentives and energy ef-
ficiency goals.  
 In 2007, the city of Boulder, Colorado became the first entity with-
in the United States to institute a carbon tax.8 But, Boulder’s carbon 
tax is not considered to be a pure tax because it amounts to a sur-
charge on electricity coming from the coal plant that powers most of 
Boulder.9 One of the best models of a carbon tax is that of British Co-
lumbia (B.C.), originally passed in 2008.10 B.C.’s carbon tax is levied 
at the point of importation, purchase, or final use of the fuel itself,11 
as opposed to being levied on the purchase of fuel-produced electrici-
ty. Under the tax, B.C.’s fossil fuel use has dropped by 15.1%, and its 
goal is to reduce emissions by 33% of 2007 levels by 2020.12 And from 
2008 to 2010, B.C.’s per capita GHG emissions declined by 9.9%.13 If 
B.C.’s emissions reductions are indicative of anything, it is that a 
carbon tax can reduce emissions without halting growth.  
                                                                                                                                       
 4. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,839. 
 5. Id.; EPA FAQ, supra note 2, at 18. 
 6. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,839; EPA FAQ, supra note 2, at 18. 
 7. See generally Climate Change: State Policy Update 2011, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/climate-
change-state-policy-update-2011.aspx#resolutions (last updated Aug. 2011) (summarizing 
various state responses, whether positive or negative, to the prospect of EPA-mandated 
GHG regulations). 
 8. See ROBERT HENSON, THE THINKING PERSON’S GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 384 (2014). 
 9. See BOULDER, COLO., MUN. CODE ch. 3-12-1 to -7 (2012); NEHA BHATT & MICHAEL 
RYAN, CARBON ENERGY TAX, available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/documents/ 
Boulder-Carbon-Tax.pdf. 
 10. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40 (Can.). 
 11. Id. at c. 40, pt. 3. 
 12. SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY, BRITISH COLUMBIA’S CARBON TAX SHIFT: THE FIRST 
FOUR YEARS 5, 7 (2012), available at http://www.sustainableprosperity.ca/sites/default/ 
files/publications/files/British%20Columbia’s%20Carbon%20Tax%20Shift.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 12. 




 Reducing GHG emissions through a carbon tax is not a new con-
cept. Ten countries have implemented carbon taxes to some degree, 
and two additional carbon taxes have recently been proposed.14 And 
multiple previous EPA administrators have advocated for a carbon 
tax in the past.15 In this Note, I argue that the CPP and the Clean 
Air Act (CAA) both allow for states to reach their emission goals in 
part by implementing a carbon tax. I also address some issues Flori-
da may face in implementing a carbon tax and how those concerns 
should be ameliorated. Additionally, I argue why a carbon tax would 
be generally effective at reducing GHG emissions and why a carbon 
tax makes sense as a matter of policy within the scheme set up for 
states under the CPP. While other papers argue for implementing a 
carbon tax in the states,16 this is the first paper to argue why it also 
would be compatible under the CPP. 
II.   THE PATH TO THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 
The proposed rule for GHGs has a contested history, starting with 
the 2007 landmark case: Massachusetts v. EPA.17 In Massachusetts v. 
EPA, states and environmental organizations sought judicial review 
of the EPA’s denial of a petition to issue regulations limiting the 
emissions of four GHGs—including carbon dioxide (CO2)—from mo-
bile sources.18 The Court held that the EPA is required to issue the 
regulations when it determines that an air pollutant causes or con-
tributes to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated to en-
danger public health or welfare (i.e., when the EPA makes an endan-
germent finding).19  
                                                                                                                                       
 14. See JENNY SUMNER ET AL., CARBON TAXES: A REVIEW OF EXPERIENCE AND POLICY 
DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 8 (2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/ 
47312.pdf. The total number was eleven, but Australia both enacted and then repealed a 
carbon tax in two years. Rob Taylor & Rhiannon Hoyle, Australia Becomes First Developed 
Nation to Repeal Carbon Tax, WALL ST. J. (last updated July 17, 2014, 5:51 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/australia-repeals-carbon-tax-1405560964.  
 15. HENSON, supra note 8, at 386. 
 16. See, e.g., SAMUEL D. EISENBERG ET AL., BROOKINGS, A STATE TAX APPROACH TO 
REGULATING GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT (2014), available at 
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publication/622195/doc/slspublic/Eisenberg
%20Wara%20et%20al%20A%20State%20Tax%20Approach%2022%20%May%2014.pdf; 
Joseph Whealdon, Validation for Taxation: An Argument for the Implementation of a Car-
bon Tax Under Section 111(D) of the Clean Air Act (May 2, 2014) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2440737. 
 17. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 18. Id. at 504-06. 
 19. Id. at 532-33 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)); see also Nathan D. Riccardi, 
Necessarily Hypocritical: The Legal Viability of EPA’s Regulation of Stationary Source 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 214 
(2012) (arguing that the EPA had not only the authority but also the obligation to regulate 
greenhouse gases under the CAA). 
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The first domino to fall towards the regulation of GHGs was the 
endangerment finding made by the EPA in 2009.20 The EPA found 
that six GHGs, including CO2, threaten public health and welfare.21 
Having made the endangerment finding, the EPA then issued protec-
tive regulations, limiting the emissions of four GHGs from new au-
tomobiles.22 But the EPA took the position—even before issuing the 
final motor vehicle regulations—that the legal framework existed for 
regulating stationary sources of GHGs under the CAA’s Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V provisions.23 
The current state of regulation of GHGs under PSD is as follows. 
But the EPA issued several rules and survived multiple lawsuits to 
reach this point.24 Typically, regional areas will be classified as either 
in attainment, in nonattainment, or unclassified, depending on 
                                                                                                                                       
 20. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Un-
der Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
 21. The other greenhouse gases include methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydro-
fluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6). Id. at 
66,497, 66,502. The rule also discussed the legal framework justifying the  
endangerment finding:  
First, the Administrator is required to protect public health and welfare, but 
she is not asked to wait until harm has occurred. . . . Second, the Administrator 
is to exercise judgment by weighing risks, assessing potential harms, and mak-
ing reasonable projections of future trends and possibilities.  
  . . . Third, . . . the Administrator is to consider the cumulative impact of 
sources of a pollutant in assessing the risks from air pollution, and is not to 
look only at the risks attributable to a single source or class of sources. Fourth, 
the Administrator is to consider the risks to all parts of our population, includ-
ing those who are at greater risk for reasons such as increased susceptibility to ad-
verse health effects. 
Id. at 66,505-06. 
 22. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average 
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,669 (May 7, 2010) [hereinafter Mobile 
GHG Rule]. The new limitations, announced under President Obama’s National Fuel Effi-
ciency Policy, will lower emissions by setting minimum fuel efficiency standards, which 
should reach 35.5 MpG in 2016 for light-duty vehicles. Id. 
 23. Kyle Danish et al., The Clean Air Act and Global Climate Change, in THE CLEAN 
AIR ACT HANDBOOK 521, 529 (Julie R. Domike & Alec C. Zacaroli eds., 3d ed. 2011)  
[hereinafter CAA HANDBOOK]. 
 24. See ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41103, FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONS 
FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT’S CLIMATE CHANGE DECISION IN MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA: 
A CHRONOLOGY 6 (2014) (listing the various measures that agencies have taken in wake of 
the named case); supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text; see also Util. Air Regulatory 
Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (surviving a challenge that its regulation of new and 
modified sources of GHGs under Title V and PSD was outside the EPA’s scope of authority 
but invalidating the Tailoring Rule); Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (surviv-
ing a challenge to five rules promulgated by the EPA to ensure authority to regulate exist-
ing sources of GHGs); Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 
2012) (challenging the motor vehicle emission standards), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). But see Ctr. for Biological Diversi-
ty v. EPA, 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (vacating EPA’s decision to defer regulation of 
biogenic sources of carbon dioxide, e.g., ethanol, for three years).  




whether a pollutant’s concentration in the ambient air exceeds the 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), meets the 
NAAQS, or cannot be determined (respectively).25 The PSD provision 
requires that new major stationary sources of “NSR pollutant[s]”26 
within areas designated as in attainment or unclassified (regardless 
of whether that pollutant is the pollutant for which NAAQS have 
been attained) install the best available control technology (BACT).27 
The term “NSR pollutant” is specifically defined to comply with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 
which decreased the range of GHG sources the EPA could regulate 
from 83% to 80%.28  
The EPA justified the regulatory expansion with a number of 
guidance documents, initially beginning with a revisit to the Johnson 
Memorandum to clarify ambiguity on which pollutants would be reg-
ulated under the PSD program.29 The Johnson Memorandum was 
originally issued in 2008.30 After revisiting the Johnson Memoran-
dum, the EPA concluded that any pollutant otherwise subject to reg-
ulation under the CAA could be regulated under PSD.31 The issue of 
                                                                                                                                       
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d) (2012). 
 26. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50) (2014). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(3); 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(a)(7)(i). 
 28. 134 S. Ct. at 2438-39, 2448-49. Currently, GHGs are subject to regulation if:  
The stationary source is a new major stationary source for a regulated NSR pol-
lutant that is not GHGs, and also will emit or will have the potential to emit 
75,000 [tons per year of carbon dioxide] or more; or [t]he stationary source is an 
existing major stationary source for a regulated NSR pollutant that is not 
GHGs, and also will have an emissions increase of a regulated NSR pollutant, 
and an emissions increase of 75,000 [tons per year of carbon dioxide] or  
more . . . . 
40 C.F.R. § 51.166(48)(iv)(a), (iv)(b). The term “regulation,” in the context of 
GHGs, also refers to: 
[N]ew stationary source[s] that will emit or have the potential to emit 100,000 
[tons per year of carbon dioxide]; . . . existing stationary source[s] that emit[] or 
ha[ve] the potential to emit 100,000 [tons per year of carbon dioxide], when 
such stationary source undertakes a physical change or change in the method 
of operation that will result in an emissions increase of 75,000 [tons per year of 
carbon dioxide] or more. 
Id. § 51.166(48)(v)(a), (v)(b). 
 29. See Danish et al., supra note 23, at 530; Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, 
Administrator, to Regional Administrators, EPA’s Interpretation of Regulations that De-
termine Pollutants Covered by Federal Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Per-
mit Program (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd_ 
interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf; Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, EPA Administrator, to David 
Bookbinder, Chief Climate Counsel, Sierra Club (Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://epa.gov/nsr/documents/20090217LPJlettertosierraclub.pdf. 
 30. See Danish et al., supra note 23, at 530.  
 31. EPA, RECONSIDERATION OF INTERPRETATION OF REGULATIONS THAT DETERMINE 
POLLUTANTS COVERED BY CLEAN AIR ACT PERMITTING PROGRAMS 1-2, available at 
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timing the dual regulations remained (because PSD regulation could 
not occur before mobile source regulation began), so the EPA issued 
the Timing Rule.32 The Timing Rule determined that the regulation 
would be legally effective when the regulation became legally en-
forceable: January 2, 2011.33  
The EPA also issued the Tailoring Rule to limit the types of facili-
ties it would regulate under the PSD and Title V programs.  The Tai-
loring Rule was needed because the CAA requires PSD and Title V 
permitting for any facility emitting as little as 100 or 250 tons per 
year.34 For most conventional pollutants, this standard is sufficiently 
high to ensure only large emitters require permitting. However, CO2 
pollution is so widespread and excessive that even non-traditionally 
regulated facilities, such as commercial buildings, would require the 
installation of BACT.35 Therefore, the EPA issued a Tailoring Rule, 
under which the EPA would only apply PSD permitting requirements 
to new sources emitting at least 100,000 tons of CO2 per year and 
sources modified to increase emissions by at least 75,000 tons of CO2 
per year.36 
                                                                                                                                       
http://epa.gov/nsr/documents/psd_memo_recon_032910.pdf; see also Danish et al., supra 
note 23, at 530-31 (noting that the Johnson Memorandum’s interpretation of “pollutant” 
was reaffirmed because the mobile source regulation occurred in tandem with the revisitation). 
 32.  Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Cov-
ered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004, 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) 
[hereinafter Timing Rule]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475(a), 7479(1), 7661(2)(B), 7602(j) (2012). 
 35. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring 
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]. The Tailoring 
Rule start date coincides with the start date in the Timing Rule. See Timing Rule, supra 
note 32. 
 36. Tailoring Rule, supra note 35, at 31,516; Standards of Performance for Green-
house Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 
Fed. Reg. 1430, 1430 (2014); see also Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule Step 3 and GHG Plantwide Applicability Limits, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 41,051 (July 12, 2012) (Phase 3, which continues indefinitely, leaves the limitations 
from Phase 2 unchanged). The EPA left the Phase 2 limitations unchanged in part because 
a number of states had not yet updated their SIPs to include legal authorities sufficient to 
permit PSD and Title V for GHG sources. Id. at 41,052; see also Action to Ensure Authority 
to Issue Permits Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Finding of Failure to Submit State Implementation Plan Revi-
sions Required for Greenhouse Gases, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,874 (Dec. 29, 2010) (finding that 
thirteen states had inadequate permitting authorities). A federal implementation plan 
(FIP) was almost issued for Texas, but at the eleventh hour EPA and Texas came to an 
agreement on permitting. See Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation 
Plans; Withdrawal of Federal Implementation Plan; Texas; Prevention of Significant Dete-
rioration; Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule Revisions, 79 Fed. Reg. 9,123, 9,123 (Feb. 18, 
2014); Determinations Concerning Need for Error Correction, Partial Approval and Partial 
Disapproval, and Federal Implementation Plan Regarding Texas’s Prevention of Signifi-
cant Deterioration Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 25,178, 25,178 (May 3, 2011). See generally Texas 
v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (three states that had not submitted SIPs, including 
Texas, elected to challenge the EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs). The EPA entered into 




III.   SUBSECTION 111(D): EPA’S AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE CLEAN 
POWER PLAN 
Normally a state establishes a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to 
meet the NAAQS for criteria pollutants. However, GHGs have not 
been listed as criteria pollutants. Instead, existing stationary sources 
of GHGs are regulated under CAA subsection 111(d), under which 
the EPA may regulate pollutants that have neither been listed as 
hazardous air pollutants (HAPs)37 nor as criteria pollutants38 and 
have also been regulated under subsection 111(b) (which applies to 
newly constructed categories of stationary sources listed by the EPA 
as a criteria pollutant, HAP, or otherwise).39 Because most pollutants 
emitted from stationary sources are regulated as criteria pollutants 
or HAPs, 111(d) is rarely utilized to regulate an existing stationary 
source of a pollutant.40 The last instance in which 111(d) was used 
was back in 1996, and it was never interpreted by the courts.41 Air 
pollutants under 111(d) and 111(b) are regulated through technology-
based emission standards, in contrast to ambient conditions for regu-
lating criteria pollutants.42  
Under 111(d), the EPA first determines the best system of emis-
sions reduction (BSER) for existing EGUs emitting GHGs by weigh-
ing the cost of existing technology against the health, environmental, 
and energy impacts of not implementing that specific type of technol-
ogy.43 Based on the BSER, EPA issues emission guidelines for states 
                                                                                                                                       
negotiations with these states to set deadlines to update their SIPs, and if the states 
missed the deadlines, the EPA would issue a stricter FIP. Danish et al., supra note 23, at 
533. 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012). 
 38. Id. § 7408. Nitrogen oxide, ozone, particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, carbon mon-
oxide, and lead are the only criteria pollutants listed by the EPA. Richard E. Ayres & Jes-
sica L. Olson, Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in CAA HANDBOOK, supra 
note 23, at 13, 13.  
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
 40. See EPA FAQ, supra note 2, at 2; Robert J. Martineau Jr. & Michael K. Stagg, 
New Source Performance Standards, in CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 321, 331; see 
also Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,606, 28,616 (May 18, 2005) [hereinafter CAMR] 
(proposing initially to regulate mercury under § 111(d)). 
 41. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Guidelines for Control 
of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 61 Fed. Reg. 9,905, 9,905 (Mar. 12, 
1996); EPA FAQ, supra note 2, at 2. 
 42. Martineau & Stagg, supra note 40, at 321. Subsection 111(d)’s focus on technolo-
gy-based standards contrasts the typical U.S. approach to regulating air pollutants 
through risk-based standards. See NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING 
AIR POLLUTION IN THE COMMON LAW STATE 3, 10 (2003). Risk-based standards are followed 
by the traditional nuisance common law approach and the CAA. See id. 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012); see ZACHARY A. SMITH, THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
PARADOX 99 (Pearson Educ., Inc., 5th ed. 2009). 
1042  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1035 
 
to follow in developing and implementing their state plans.44 States 
do not have to utilize the BSER determined by the EPA. Instead, the 
BSER acts as more of a feasibility proxy that a state may mimic with 
a different system of emissions reduction: one it thinks is “best” un-
der its state-specific circumstances. 
The implementation of BSER applies “without regard to the actual 
ambient air quality in a particular area, and imposes emissions con-
trol technology requirements at the time a source is built, regardless 
of its location,”45 for both new and existing sources of GHGs.46 One of 
the reasons section 111 utilizes technology-based standards is that it 
allows for states to compete on equal footing for new industrial 
growth.47 In contrast to 111, “[u]nder the NAAQS, as implemented 
through the [SIPs], areas with cleaner air could gain an economic ad-
vantage over those in nonattainment since the former could set less 
stringent pollution control requirements.”48  Considering that some 
states are in a better position than others to utilize alternative fuel 
sources,49 a level playing field is fairer for industries within those states. 
                                                                                                                                       
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012); Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,834. Flor-
ida can take this opportunity to supplement its existing enforcement scheme with policies 
designed specifically for GHG reduction enforcement. An enforcement scheme designed 
specifically to enforce GHG limits may be appropriate because a state may design a regula-
tory scheme much different than the traditional command-and-control option. For instance, 
if a state may develop a cap-and-trade program to lower GHGs, its existing enforcement 
measures would likely be developed solely to enforce a command-and-control approach to 
regulation, not an alternative, GHG-appropriate regulatory scheme. Furthermore, the EPA 
can list “adequately demonstrated systems” that will also reach the required level of emis-
sions reduction. 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(b)(2)-(3) (2014). 
 45. Martineau & Stagg, supra note 40, at 321.  
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1) (2012); see also Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Un-
der the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,363 (Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing) (July 30, 2008) (addressing concerns from the Department of Transportation that uti-
lization of sections 108 and 109, the consequent setting of NAAQS, and amending SIPs for 
GHGs would negatively affect infrastructure). The Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing highlighted three main difficulties with regulating GHGs as criteria pollutants: 
1. The determination of what GHG concentration level is requisite to protect 
public health and welfare;  
2. the unique nature of GHGs as pollutants dispersed from sources throughout 
the world and that have long atmospheric lifetimes; and 
3. GHG concentrations in the ambient air are virtually the same throughout 
the world meaning that they are not higher near major emissions sources 
than in isolated areas with no industry or major anthropogenic sources of 
GHG emissions. 
Id. at 44,367. 
 47. Martineau & Stagg, supra note 40, at 321.  
 48. Id. 
 49. In setting the goals for each state, the EPA considered each state’s access to alter-
native fuel sources, both renewable and nonrenewable, by projecting their continued use. 
Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,887-88. 




IV.   THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 
Finally, the tumultuous administrative history of GHG regula-
tions culminated in the CPP: a plan to regulate existing stationary 
sources of CO2.50 With the presence of existing state-level GHG regu-
lations, such as California’s cap-and-trade program51 and the Region-
al Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),52 the EPA has stated its at-
tempt to afford states some flexibility.53 The CPP affords states “con-
siderable flexibility” in regard to the timeframes in which a state 
must develop and implement its plans to meet its state-specific 
goals.54 States have up to two or three years to submit their final 
plans and have up to fifteen years to implement all reduction 
measures elucidated within the plans.55 While a state is limited to a 
few, specific options for the regulatory tools it may utilize to reach 
those goals,56 the EPA has explicitly said that a state’s chosen control 
measures need not be as EGU-centric as the proposed rule’s title 
suggests. For instance, the EPA has listed alternative control 
measures like energy efficiency programs and renewable portfolio 
standards.57 The EPA suggests expanded use of these programs to 
meet the state goals. Continually, throughout the CPP, the EPA ref-
erences a portfolio approach to reducing emissions.58 Through the 
portfolio approach, a state can use multiple regulatory programs to 
reduce emissions. However, “[a] state plan must include enforceable 
CO2 emission limits (either rate-based or mass-based) that apply to 
affected EGUs.”59 The EPA leaves two options: (1) the direct limita-
                                                                                                                                       
 50. Id. 
 51. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801-96022 (2012). 
 52. The RGGI is an agreement among Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to lower GHG emis-
sions through an interstate cap-and-trade program. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, 
ABOUT THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE (RGGI) [hereinafter ABOUT RGGI], 
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_Fact_Sheet.pdf. The initiative has 
a model rule for member states to implement for the legal authority to participate in the 
program. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, MODEL RULE PART XX CO2 BUDGET  
TRADING PROGRAM, available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview/ 
_FinalProgramReviewMaterials/Model_Rule_FINAL.pdf. 
 53. See generally CHRISTOPHER E. VAN ATTEN, M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCS., LLC, 
STRUCTURING POWER PLANT EMISSIONS STANDARDS UNDER SECTION 111(D) OF THE  
CLEAN AIR ACT—STANDARDS FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2013), available at 
http://www.mjbradley.com/sites/default/files/Options%20for%20Regulating%20Power%
20Plants%20Under%20Section%20111%20Final.pdf (urging the EPA to adopt market-based 
regulatory approaches to help further the interests of multiple power companies and detail-
ing CAA Section 111 background). 
 54. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,833. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 34,901. 
 59. Id. at 34,851, 34,909. 
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tion of emissions from EGUs or (2) a portfolio approach of direct limi-
tations and “other measures that have the effect of limiting genera-
tion by, and therefore emissions from, the affected sources.”60 The 
CPP continues to refer to plans that must include limitations that 
apply directly to affected EGUs and also refers to programs like re-
newable energy programs and energy efficiency programs that do not 
apply directly to affected EGUs. If these two sets of programs are re-
ferred to separately, then control measures that apply directly to af-
fected EGUs cannot include measures like renewable energy portfoli-
os and energy efficiency programs. A carbon tax does not directly re-
quire EGUs to lower their emissions, so it would have to be included 
as a portfolio measure. 
 The CPP briefly covers different existing state policies and pro-
grams that could be included in the state plans. The different polices 
include market-based emission limits (like California’s and RGGI’s 
cap-and-trade programs), existing state emission limits on new 
and/or expanded EGUs,61 utility planning approaches (in which 
states and utilities adopt a plan to reduce emissions over time), re-
newable portfolio standards (whereby states require electricity sup-
pliers to supply a portion of electricity generated from renewable 
sources), demand-side energy efficiency programs (for example, 
providing tax credits to buildings that use energy efficiency 
measures),62 and energy efficiency resource standards (which require 
utilities to save a certain amount of energy each year).63 The CPP 
does not list a carbon tax as an available tool for states. The argu-
ment could be made that the EPA does not have enough experience 
with regulating under a carbon tax, however, the same could be said 
for all of the existing policies implemented by states.64 And the pro-
                                                                                                                                       
 60. Id. at 34,851. 
 61. Washington, Oregon, California, and New York currently have emission limits on 
EGUs of different electrical capacities. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,848-50. 
 62. See generally HENSON, supra note 8, at 428-32 (covering various voluntary energy 
efficiency programs). 
 63. See Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,848-50.  
 64. For this reason, the EPA has requested comment on whether it should make the 
portfolio control measures practically enforceable, as opposed to federally enforceable. Id. 
at 34,902. On one hand, making the measures federally enforceable should ensure that the 
EPA maintains a level playing field. The goal behind the EPA’s deterrence-based enforce-
ment approach is to disgorge any benefit a noncomplying facility may gain by violating the 
law. John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: Process, 
Actors, and Trends, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 10, 14 (2004); see Robert E. Hudec, Differ-
ences in National Environmental Standards: The Level-Playing-Field Dimension, 5 MINN. 
J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1996). The enforcement action then brings the noncomplying facility to 
the same level as complying facilities, thus ensuring a level playing field. Without a level 
playing field, not only would regulated facilities be incentivized to not comply, but they 
would also gain a competitive advantage over complying facilities. If the plans are not 
made federally enforceable, then the EPA would be relying on the states to ensure a level 
playing field, and they would be ensuring a level playing field in an area where states have 
been less than amenable to regulation. Or, if the measures are made federally enforceable, 




posed rule should allow states to lower emissions with a carbon tax 
so long as it “[has] the effect of limiting generation by, and therefore 
emissions from, the affected sources.”65 I further explore the authori-
ty for Florida to implement a carbon tax under section 111(d) and the 
CPP in Part V. 
Normally when the EPA promulgates a new rule requiring states 
to amend their SIPs, the EPA will issue a model rule intended to 
guide states’ decision-making processes. Some states will adopt the 
model rule for administrative efficiency and for the guarantee of ac-
ceptance.66 The EPA, however, has not issued a model rule for the 
CPP. The EPA likely did not issue a model rule because the EPA 
foresees states using the portfolio approach. The potential patchwork 
of different states utilizing different combinations within their portfolio 
measures would create an administrative headache for the EPA. How-
ever, a partial model rule relating to the direct emissions limitations 
from affected EGUs would have been helpful for clarification purposes.  
The EPA found the BSER to be any combination of four different 
building blocks: heat rate improvements, redispatching, renewable 
energy generation, and energy efficiency.67 The building blocks are 
                                                                                                                                       
the EPA would be occupying an area in which states have more experience and invested 
regulatory capital. Or it may not matter at all because most portfolio measures will likely 
only elicit voluntary participation, and a tax would only depend on facilities monitoring 
and reporting their emissions, which they already do, assuming the tax is applied to emis-
sions. See infra discussion Part VII (discussing in further detail the ways in which a carbon 
tax may be levied on facilities). CPP’s potential reliance on practicable enforceability has 
precedence at the EPA. For comparison, facilities’ potential to emit limits, under the CAA’s 
New Source Review Program, were once required to be federally enforceable. See Bernard 
F. Hawkins Jr. & Mary Ellen Ternes, The New Source Review Program, in CAA 
HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 125, 144. But the U.S. Court of Appeals vacated the require-
ment. See Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 70 F.3d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Now, the EPA requires 
that the requirements simply be “practicably enforceable.” Hawkins Jr. & Ternes, supra, at 144. 
 65. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,851. 
 66. See Whealdon, supra note 16, at 8-9 & n.47 (describing states’ efficiency motiva-
tions for adopting model SIPs). 
 67. The building blocks include:  
1. Reducing the carbon intensity of generation at individual affected 
EGUs through heat rate improvements.  
2. Reducing emissions from the most carbon-intensive affected EGUs 
in the amount that results from substituting generation at those 
EGUs with generation from less carbon-intensive affected EGUs (in-
cluding natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) units that are under  
construction). 
3. Reducing emissions from affected EGUs in the amount that results 
from substituting generation at those EGUs with expanded low- or 
zero-carbon generation. 
4. Reducing emissions from affected EGUs in the amount that results 
from the use of demand-side energy efficiency that reduces the 
amount of generation required. 
Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,851. 
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not the policies a state would implement. Instead, the building blocks 
are the actual, physical means EGUs have to reduce emissions. The 
purpose of setting the different policies, including a carbon tax, is to 
reduce emissions at a rate to determine the best benefit to the public 
health at the lowest cost to EGUs and, by extension, consumers.68 
The EPA, using state-specific data, formulated its state-specific 
goals under a single methodology. This data included factors like a 
state’s potential to generate, import, and connect to its grid renewa-
ble energy and natural gas. But the goals are formed with the expec-
tation that states will go beyond their existing programs (like renew-
able energy portfolios and energy efficiency projects) to reduce emis-
sions.69 Furthermore, states may implement a multi-state, regional 
approach, like the RGGI. A multi-state program would be accompa-
nied by a multi-state goal equivalent to each state’s individual 
goals.70 Within the CPP, the EPA acknowledged the success of the 
RGGI in reducing emissions: “Between 2005, when an agreement to 
implement RGGI was announced, and 2012, power sector CO2 emis-
sions in the RGGI participating states fell by more than 40 percent.”71 
States can convert the rate-based goals to mass-based goals.72 
“The conversion must represent the tons of CO2 emissions that are 
projected to be emitted by affected EGUs, in the absence of emission 
standards contained in the plan, if the affected EGUs were to per-
form at an average lb CO2/MWh rate equal to the rate-based  
                                                                                                                                       
 68. See id. at 34,835 (stating that “10 states have market-based GHG emission pro-
grams, 38 states have renewable portfolio standards or goals, and utilities in 47 states run 
demand-side energy efficiency programs”). Of these programs, Florida only has a demand-
side energy efficiency program. See Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act, FLA. 
STAT. §§ 366.80-83 (2014). One of the building blocks, heat rate improvements, is actually 
economically efficient for EGUs to implement because it translates to producing more en-
ergy from each unit of coal. See DAVID HASLER, SARGENT & LUNDY, LLC, COAL-FIRED 
POWER PLANT HEAT RATE REDUCTIONS (2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/ 
resource/docs/coalfired.pdf. Current studies estimate that heat rate improvements could 
reduce emissions from a range of less than 5% to greater than 15%. OFFICE OF 
AIR & RADIATION, EPA, 450R13002, DOCUMENTATION FOR EPA BASE CASE V.5.13 USING 
THE INTEGRATED PLANNING MODEL (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarket/ 
documents/ipm/Documentation.pdf. Under the CPP, the EPA estimates heat rate im-
provements, on average, can reduce emissions by 6%. EPA V5.13 BASE CASE 
DOCUMENTATION SUPPLEMENT TO SUPPORT EPA’S PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION 
GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS 1 [hereinafter EPA BASE 
SUPPLEMENT], available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/powersectormodeling/ 
docs/EPA%20Base%20Case%20v5%2013%20Documentation%20Supplement%20for%20CPP_
6_12_14.pdf. 
 69. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,837. 
 70. Id. at 34,834, 34,836, 34,851. 
 71. Id. at 34,848; see also id. at 34,855 (noting the success of the RGGI and multi-state 
programs, generally). 
 72. Id. at 34,837. 




goal . . . .”73 EPA’s guidance on how to convert to a mass-based goal 
would be confusing without the accompanied technical support doc-
ument, which provides details on how the rate-based goals were cal-
culated.74 Florida’s interim goal, to be reached during the phase-in 
period between 2020 and 2029, is 794 average pounds of CO2 per net 
MWh from all affected fossil fuel-fired EGUs.75 Florida’s final rule, to 
be reached by 2030, is 740 average pounds of CO2 per net MWh from 
all affected fossil fuel-fired EGUs.76 A mass-based goal would be pref-
erable because meeting a rate-based goal would not necessarily lower 
overall emissions if more electricity is produced at a rate more effi-
cient, relative to the goal, than the emission of CO2. 
V.   SUBSECTION 111(D) SUPPORTS A CARBON TAX 
A.   Does a Carbon Tax Qualify as a Performance Standard? 
There is a possible legal issue with the EPA’s interpretation of the 
CAA: the interpretation allows the CAA to expand the reach of 111(d) 
to reach entities other than affected EGUs to lower emissions.77 Some 
of the portfolio measures, for example energy efficiency and a carbon 
tax (depending on when/where it is levied), would reduce emissions 
by acting upon entities other than EGUs. It may have been Con-
gress’s intent to only authorize the EPA to reduce pollutants solely by 
regulating affected EGUs. Additionally, the EPA’s rare use of 111(d) 
makes a comparison to prior regulatory schemes difficult.78 Section 
                                                                                                                                       
 73. Id. at 34,953. If Florida implements a cap-and-trade program, it will have to con-
vert to a mass-based goal because cap-and-trade can only function with a mass-based goal. 
Jennifer A. Smokelin, EPA Clean Power Proposal May Fuel State Cap and Trade, LAW 360 
(June 27, 2014, 11:04 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/551835/epa-clean-power-
proposal-may-fuel-state-cap-and-trade; see also ABOUT RGGI, supra note 52 (noting that 
the RGGI’s mass-based goal is “91 million short tons [in 2014] . . . [and] declines 2.5% each 
year from 2015 to 2020”). 
 74. OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA, GOAL COMPUTATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT 
DOCUMENT (2014), available at http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/ 
documents/20140602tsd-goal-computation.pdf.  
 75. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,895. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 34,902. 
 78. JEREMY M. TARR ET AL., NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE 
UNIV., REGULATING CARBON DIOXIDE UNDER SECTION 111(D) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT: 
OPTIONS, LIMITS, AND IMPACTS 5 (2013), available at https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/ 
sites/default/files/publications/ni_r_13-01.pdf (discussing the decision in the context of 
111(d)). The EPA initially intended to regulate mercury under 111(d), but then interpreted 
the section to not allow regulation of sources of pollutants regulated under 112. See Na-
tional Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Elec-
tric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304, 9,308 n.6 (Feb. 16, 2012); 
CAMR, supra note 40, at 28,616. 
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111, on its face, is silent on the issue of whether a “standard of per-
formance” can include standards for unaffected entities that indirect-
ly affect EGUs.79 Therefore, the EPA inserted its reasonable interpre-
tation under Chevron v. NRDC.80 The EPA’s reasonable interpreta-
tion of the CAA confers authority to set performance standards for un-
affected entities, so long as they lower emissions from affected EGUs.81 
 The Supreme Court previously had the opportunity to limit the 
extension of performance standards. In Engine Manufacturer’s Ass’n 
v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, a trade association 
challenged the local air quality management district’s rule restricting 
the purchase of fleet vehicles to those that met motor vehicle emis-
sion standards.82 The issue was whether the sale prohibition quali-
fied as a “standard relating to the control of emissions . . . .”83 Tradi-
tionally, as the lower court held, a standard is a regulation that di-
rectly requires manufacturers to meet specified emission limits, as 
opposed to indirectly like the sale prohibition at issue.84  In review, 
the Court defined a standard as any criterion or test designed to re-
duce emissions, which would include both manufacturer and pur-
chase restrictions.85 Therefore, a criterion relating to the purchase of 
the vehicles, rather than mandating how a manufacturer builds the 
vehicles, is still a standard under section 202 of the CAA, which re-
lates to motor vehicle emissions.86 Similarly, a performance standard 
under section 111 is defined as “a standard for emissions of air pollu-
tants . . . .”87 Therefore, “performance standards” under 111 should be 
as broadly defined as it is under 202, including regulations extending 
past the affected entities (the manufacturers) to the sales and pur-
chases of fossil fuels. 
 Subsection 111(d) refers to subsection 110(a) when describing the 
form a plan should take.88 To ensure that a performance standard 
can encompass a carbon tax, this Note will also analyze subsection 
                                                                                                                                       
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2012); Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,902. 
 80. 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). 
 81. Id.  
 82. 541 U.S. 246, 255-56 (2004); see EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 16, at 5-6 (discuss-
ing the applicability of a carbon tax to a performance standard under the CAA, § 111(d)); 
see also CAMR, supra note 40, at 28,616 (determining that a cap-and-trade system for reg-
ulating mercury qualifies as a standard of performance).  
 83. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n, 541 U.S. at 251. 
 84. Id. at 252-53. 
 85. Id. at 253. 
 86. Id.; see Brad Lee Bonner, Clean Air Through Statutory Construction: Engine 
Manufacturers Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 9 GREAT PLAINS 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 53, 60-61 (2004); see also New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (not reaching the question of whether a cap-and-trade system is a performance 
standard under section 111). 
 87. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (2012), with 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2012). 
 88. See § 7411(d)(1). 




110(a). Section 110 refers to “provisions . . . prohibiting . . . any 
source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emit-
ting any air pollutant” that contributes to or interferes with attaining 
the NAAQS.89 The reference to “emissions activity” should be broad 
enough to include the portfolio performance standards, which can 
include a carbon tax. Instead of prescribing that states implement 
traditional command-and-control regulations to achieve the NAAQS, 
subsection 110(a) provides a non-exhaustive list of “other control 
measures” to achieve compliance.90 For instance, the statute suggests 
alternative means of implementation including “economic incentives 
such as fees, marketable permits, and auctions of emissions  
rights . . . .”91 A carbon tax is an example of a fee in much the same 
way that 110 supports a cap-and-trade program as a “marketable 
permit[].”92 Additionally, other articles have argued that the wide 
nets of sections 111 and, by reference, 110 support cap-and-trade and 
energy efficiency programs as a means to reduce emissions.93  
B.   Could a Carbon Tax Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause? 
Depending on the point where the carbon tax is levied, Florida 
may encounter a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.94 Any dis-
criminatory performance standards, such as only levying carbon tax-
                                                                                                                                       
 89. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)-(ii). 
 90. Id. § 7410. 
 91. Id. § 7410(2)(a). 
 92. See id.; see also M. Rhead Enion, Using Section 111 of the Clean Air Act for Cap-
and-Trade of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Obstacles and Solutions, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 1 (2012) (arguing that a cap-and-trade program under 111 could easily be trans-
lated to a program under 110). 
 93. See, e.g., KATE KONSCHNIK & ARI PESKOE, HARVARD LAW SCH. ENVTL. LAW 
PROGRAM, THE CASE FOR END-USE ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS IN THE SECTION 111(D) 
RULE FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2014), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
environmentallawprogram/files/2013/03/The-Role-of-Energy-Efficiency-in-the-111d-Rule.pdf 
(discussing 111(d) and the use of economic considerations to allow for the use of energy-
efficiency programs); Enion, supra note 92.  
 94. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383, 390-91 (1994) (holding 
that a town’s ordinance requiring that all solid waste processed or handled in the town be 
processed at the town’s transfer station violated the Dormant Commerce Clause because it 
discriminated based on where the service is provided); Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. 
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (“Though phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Con-
gress, the Clause has long been understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the 
States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of arti-
cles of commerce.”). A regulation requiring that a product be manufactured without a toxic 
chemical within a city, county, or state, may also unduly burden interstate commerce by 
discriminating against manufacturing occurring outside of the state or political subdivi-
sion. See id. However, if the state or political subdivision can show that, under rigorous 
scrutiny, it has no other means to advance a legitimate state interest, even a discriminato-
ry regulation will be upheld. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148-49 (1986) (holding that 
Maine’s ban on the import of shellfish did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause be-
cause it was the only way to prevent the spread of disease). 
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es on fossil fuels produced outside of Florida, would violate the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.95 However, the carbon tax, as written, 
would tax all sales of fossil fuels. Still, much of Florida’s energy is 
produced from natural gas and coal exported to Florida.96 Therefore, 
even if a carbon tax is written and implemented without discrimina-
tory intent, it could be indirectly discriminatory. The only way that a 
nondiscriminatory requirement that is enforced both in-state and 
out-of-state would be found to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause 
is if “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits.”97 With a carbon tax levied at 
the time of importation, the imposed burden would amount to a heft-
ier price on imports, while the local benefits would be a reduction in a 
known atmospheric pollutant, CO2, and compliance with Florida’s 
EPA-mandated goal. The tax, at importation, would be levied onto all 
fossil fuels, based on carbon intensity. The tax would be distributed 
mostly among natural gas, which, in 2013, produced 62% of Florida’s 
power; 21% of Florida’s power was produced from coal.98 
However, a recent case out of Minnesota applied the Dormant 
Commerce Clause to regulations affecting interstate transactions, 
with the goal of reducing state emissions.99 In North Dakota v. Hey-
dinger, a trial-level court held that a law preventing the construction 
of new facilities that would contribute an increase to net state-wide 
GHG emissions, as well as the importation of electricity from out-of-
state facilities that would have the same effect, violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.100 The court held that the statute was invalid be-
                                                                                                                                       
 95. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 (“ ‘[D]iscrimination’ simply means differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and bur-
dens the latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid.”). 
 96. See Florida State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=FL [hereinafter Fla. Energy Estimates] (last visited May 5, 
2015) (noting that in 2012, Florida produced 19 trillion Btus, out of several thousand tril-
lions of Btus consumed). A new natural gas site in Collier County did not begin operation 
until earlier in 2014, however. Currently, operations are suspended. See Craig Pittman, 
Texas Oil Company Used Acid in Florida Wildlife Sanctuary Soil, Denies Fracking, TAMPA 
BAY TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014, 5:57 PM), http://www.placead.tampabay.com/news/ 
environment/water/texas-oil-company-injected-acid-in-soil-of-florida-wildlife-sanctuary/2176743; 
Press Release, Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., DEP and Collier County Enter into an Agreement 
on Dan A. Hughes Enforcement (Oct. 17, 2014), available at http://content.govdelivery.com/ 
accounts/FLDEP/bulletins/d6750a.  
 97. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (“Where the statute regulates 
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate 
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”). 
 98. Fla. Energy Estimates, supra note 96. 
 99. See generally Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-
Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
243 (1999) (addressing potential Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to various market-
based environmental approaches, including renewable portfolio standards and taxes). 
 100. North Dakota v. Heydinger, 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 906-07 (D. Minn. 2014). 




cause it attempted to regulate transactions occurring between out-of-
state facilities, therefore violating the extraterritoriality doctrine.101 
The court reasoned that the transactions falling within the purview 
of the law could be occurring wholly out-of-state because of how pow-
er is distributed.102 Power is distributed throughout the region and 
across state boundaries by a regional transmission organization 
(“RTO”).103 And because two out-of-state facilities buying and selling 
electricity cannot ensure that a portion of that electricity will not 
cross the border into North Dakota and be removed, they could there-
fore contribute to net GHG emissions.104  
To avoid violating the extraterritoriality doctrine, a carbon tax 
could not be written so as to be levied on any electricity transactions 
occurring out-of-state; potentially, under the RTO of the southeast, 
electricity generated from out-of-state fossil fuels could incidentally 
enter Florida and therefore violate the carbon tax law. To avoid this 
issue, the carbon tax should be written to be levied on the actual fuel 
itself, as it is consumed within Florida. It could either be paid at a 
fuel depot, when the fuel is purchased, or be paid at the facility, 
where the fuel will be consumed. However, I argue in Part VII of this 
Note that the tax should be levied on the emissions themselves.105 
Therefore, it would be impossible to regulate wholly out-of-state facil-
ities. Furthermore, the tax would not discriminate against out-of-
state fuel.  
In conclusion, the CPP, 111(d), and case law support the imposi-
tion of a carbon tax. Assuming all other requirements of the plan are 
met (quantifiability, enforceability, replicability, and accountabil-
ity),106 the EPA has to approve the plan. Although section 111 does 
not contain provisions regarding how the EPA reviews a plan under 
111(d), it refers to section 110 and instructs the EPA to follow proce-
dures for section 110 (SIPs for criteria pollutants). Therefore, in lieu 
of 111(d) procedures, when approving a 111(d) plan, the EPA should 
be bound by section 110 procedures. Both section 110 and EPA regu-
lations require the approval of a 110 plan once it has met all of the 
requirements.107 In fact, the EPA regulation suggests an interpreta-
                                                                                                                                       
 101. Id. at 910-11. 
 102. Id. at 918. 
 103. Id. at 891. 
 104. Id. at 918. 
 105. See discussion infra Part VII.  
 106. See Alec C. Zacaroli, Meeting Ambient Air Standards: Development of the State 
Implementation Plans, in CAA HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 43, 48-49. 
 107. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3) (2012) (noting that “the Administrator shall approve 
such submittal as a whole if it meets all of the applicable requirements of this chapter”); 40 
C.F.R. § 52.02(a) (2014) (noting that approval of “state plans” is based solely off of meeting 
the requirements of 110 and EPA regulations). 
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tion that the procedures of 110 govern 111.108 Therefore, the EPA 
does not have the discretion to disapprove of a plan because it con-
tains a carbon tax so long as it is otherwise complete. 
VI.   POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
A.   The State of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Incentives in Florida 
A carbon tax is essentially a consumption tax similar to those al-
ready levied on luxury items, like a sales tax and other mineral tax-
es.109 However, instead of being taxed by the sheer amount of miner-
als, a carbon tax is based on the minerals’ potential to emit GHGs.110 
Because the carbon content for all types and variations of fossil fuels 
is very well known, a tax on the amount of emitted GHGs expressed 
by dollar per ton of GHGs would be easily converted to an expression 
of emitted GHGs per mass/volume of fuel.111 The tax could be levied 
at a variety of points: upstream, when the minerals are first extract-
ed or imported; downstream, immediately before combustion; or at 
any point in between.112 
The CPP also recommends that states adopt renewable energy in-
centives, energy efficiency programs, and a renewable energy portfo-
lio. Florida currently has a solar rebate program113 and a voluntary 
energy efficiency program under the Florida Energy Efficiency Con-
servation Act (FEECA).114 However, a recent decision by the Florida 
Public Service Commission (FPSC) will hinder use of these two regu-
                                                                                                                                       
 108. The regulation states: “Approval of a plan or any portion thereof is based upon a 
determination by the Administrator that such plan or portion meets the requirements of 
section 110 of the Act . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 52.02(a) (2014). The word “plan” is undefined in the 
regulations but implies a definition wider than just 110 plans. See id.  
 109. SHI-LING HSU, THE CASE FOR A CARBON TAX 16-17 (2011); see Carbon Tax Act, 
S.B.C., 2008, c. 40 (Can.); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 206.9935-55 (2014) (taxing petroleum 
products for coastal protection purposes). 
 110. HSU, supra note 109, at 15. 
 111. Id.; see Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C., 2008, c. 40, pt. 2, sched. 1 (Can.) (noting that the 
different prices of taxes are based on a flat rate of carbon content, starting with $10 a ton 
in 2008). 
 112. HSU, supra note 109, at 15-16.  
 113. See Solar Energy Systems Incentives Program, FLA. STAT. § 377.806 (2014); FLA. 
POWER & LIGHT, CO., RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC PILOT PROGRAM STANDARDS, available 
at https://www.fpl.com/save/pdf/PV_Residential_Standards.pdf; see also Renewable Energy 
and Energy-Efficient Technologies Grant Program, FLA. STAT. § 377.804 (2014) (providing 
“grants for demonstration, commercialization, research, and development projects relating 
to renewable energy technologies”). 
 114. Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 366.80-83 (2014). 
Energy efficiency in the United States has fallen behind that of some other developed na-
tions. Western European countries and Japan are still more energy efficient. What this 
means is that the United States has reduced its emissions despite a lack of energy efficien-
cy and that Florida has ample room to continue to make strides in energy efficiency, should 
it wish to do so. See GARY BRYNER & ROBERT J. DUFFY, INTEGRATING CLIMATE, ENERGY, 
AND AIR POLLUTION POLICIES 105 (2012). 




latory programs to indirectly lower emissions.115 The FPSC has de-
cided to let the solar rebate program expire in 2015 and has also ap-
proved a plan to significantly reduce energy conservation goals.116 
FPSC prescribes utility-specific goals, for both residential and indus-
trial/commercial energy use, over a ten-year period. For instance, 
Florida Power & Light’s residential goals were revised from 1,695.3 
GWh for 2010-2019 to 247.2 GWh for 2015-2024.117 Electrical utilities 
have been accused of pressuring the FPSC into making these signifi-
cant policy changes.118 The FPSC’s decision is so drastic that the state 
has passed a law to reform the FPSC.119 While, by statute, FPSC 
must revisit the goals within five years,120 the future of energy effi-
ciency in Florida looks dim. 
The decision of the FPSC has severely limited Florida’s ability to 
achieve its emissions reductions goals through the use of renewable 
energy incentives and energy efficiency programs. The use of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy incentives are the focal point of CPP 
flexibility. Additionally, Florida does not have a renewable portfolio 
requirement. The FPSC has handicapped Florida from utilizing the 
full potential of the flexible portfolio approach to reducing emissions 
(at least until these policies can be amended again or reimplement-
ed). That is why if Florida wishes to reduce emissions without enact-
ing sole, direct emissions limitations on EGUs, Florida should im-
plement a carbon tax as soon as possible. And once these policies are 
                                                                                                                                       
 115. See Memorandum from Div. of Eng’g., Div. of Econ., Office of the Gen. Counsel 
& Office of Indus. Dev. & Mkt. Analysis, to Office of Comm’n Clerk (Nov. 13, 2014) [herein-
after FPSC Memorandum], available at http://psc-fl.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php? 
view_id=2&clip_id=1327&meta_id=56594; Ivan Penn, Florida Regulators Approve Plan to 
Gut Energy Efficiency Goals, End Solar Power Rebates, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014, 
9:24 AM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/florida-regulators-meet-to-decide-
future-of-energy-efficiency-and-solar/2207845. 
 116. See FPSC Memorandum, supra note 115, at 6. The FPSC has also challenged the 
BSER used by the EPA and requested that the EPA not preempt state primacy. Comments 
to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r of EPA, re: Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, from Art Graham, Chairman, Fla. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n (Dec. 1, 2014), available at www.seealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/FPSC.pdf. 
 117. In re: Commission Review of Numeric Conservation Goals (Fla. Power & Light 
Co.), Case No. 080407-EG (FPSC, Dec. 30, 2009); FPSC Memorandum, supra note 115, at 61. 
 118. See, e.g., Anastasia Pantsios, Pressured by Big Utilities, ‘Sunshine State’ Ends 
Solar Incentive, ECOWATCH (Nov. 26, 2014, 3:59 PM), http://ecowatch.com/2014/11/26/ 
florida-ends-solar-incentive/; Kyle Swenson, Florida Regulators Gut the State’s Solar Pro-
grams, BROWARD/PALM BEACH NEW TIMES (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/ 
news/florida-regulators-gut-the-states-solar-programs-6442871.  
 119. Mitch Perry, Rick Scott Signs Bill Making Modest Reforms to Public Service 
Commission and Public Utilities, SAINTPETERSBLOG (June 10, 2015), http:// 
www.saintpetersblog.com/archives/232990; see H.R. 7109, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2015); 
Ivan Penn, Lawmakers File Bill to Reform Florida Public Service Commission, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014, 5:07 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/energy/ 
lawmakers-file-bill-to-reform-florida-public-service-commission/2209155. 
 120. See FLA. STAT. § 366.82(6) (2014). 
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reimplemented or energy goals are revised again, a carbon tax can 
operate with them in tandem.121 One of the main benefits of a carbon 
tax is that it can be implemented among multiple GHG-reducing 
regulatory remedies such as: renewable subsidies/incentives, trada-
ble emission allowances (cap-and-trade), direct emissions reductions 
(command-and-control regulation), and energy efficiency projects.122 
The easy integration of a carbon tax with other policies is a result of 
its simple design and implementation. Therefore, Florida could have 
a wide portfolio, adopting some of the portfolio measures suggested by 
the CPP.123 And if renewable energy incentives and/or FEECA are not 
reimplemented to reduce greenhouse gases, the carbon tax can be scaled 
to accomplish the GHG-reductions needed in lieu of the programs. 
B.   Comparing a Carbon Tax to Cap-and-Trade 
Cap-and-trade programs are also touted as an option that reduces 
emissions at a cost comparable to the benefits of reducing them.124 
However, the costs of emission allowances in cap-and-trade have 
been known to vary widely.125 Two examples of volatile emissions 
trading programs include the European Union Emissions Trading 
System and the trading of sulfur dioxide under the CAA.126 Under a 
cap-and-trade system, a facility has to meet its emission allocations, 
but once it does, it is alleviated from any further reductions. Alterna-
tively, a carbon tax incentivizes continued emission reductions, and 
the price can be adjusted to incentivize a specific emissions de-
crease.127 In other words: 
Carbon taxes will induce firms to abate all emissions available at a 
cost no higher than the tax rate, because for any incremental 
abatement more costly than the tax, firms would find it more cost-
effective to pay the tax. Thus, all EPA [or Florida] needs do is to 
determine the tax rate (or trajectory) equivalent to the marginal 
abatement cost imposed by the BSER on a covered source category.128 
                                                                                                                                       
 121. The new energy efficiency goals were decided without considering the CPP and 
without accounting for the cost of carbon. See FPSC Memorandum, supra note 115, at 28-
33. In contrast, prior goals were set by giving regard to the cost of carbon. See id. 
 122. See HSU, supra note 109, at 46; SUMNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 22; see also Mat-
thias Kalkuhl et al., Renewable Energy Subsides: Second-Best Policy or Fatal Aberration 
for Mitigation, 35 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 217 (2013) (finding that renewable energy 
subsidies, when implemented without any carbon pricing, lead to high welfare loss through 
increased energy prices but also finding that the implementation of carbon pricing and 
renewable energy subsides in tandem help mitigate welfare loss). 
 123. See Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,848-50. 
 124. HSU, supra note 109, at 104-05. 
 125. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE 153-54 (2008).  
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. at 59. 
 128. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 16, at 12. 




Additionally, when compared to cap-and-trade programs, carbon 
taxes are easier to design and implement and can be put into place 
more quickly.129 For the CPP to reduce emissions in the long run, re-
newable energy use needs to increase drastically, and to accomplish 
that, the cost of fossil fuels needs to increase. One way to increase the 
price of fossil fuels is through a carbon tax.130 So, a carbon tax and a 
renewable energy portfolio make a natural regulatory pair.131 Fur-
thermore, the revenue raised from the carbon tax could be invested 
into renewable energy sources.132 Finally, projections have shown 
cap-and-trade of tradable emission permits (as opposed to auctioned 
permits) to be less efficient.133 Based on projections, at a marginal 
abatement cost of $50/ton of carbon (not CO2 emissions), a carbon tax 
can reduce emissions by almost 20%, whereas a tradable permit 
scheme would only reduce emissions by about 12%.134 
                                                                                                                                       
 129. See BRYNER & DUFFY, supra note 114, at 58-59. See generally Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a 
Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009) 
(exhaustively comparing a carbon tax and cap-and-trade and finally determining a carbon 
tax will better stop climate change). 
 130. A nationwide carbon tax could have the effect of increasing carbon output in other 
countries. This is called carbon leakage, and various models and studies have reached dif-
fering conclusions in the international context. See, e.g., Harry Clarke, Carbon Leakages, 
Consumption-Based Carbon Taxes and International Climate Change Agreements, 29 
ECON. PAPERS 156 (2010); Joshua Elliott et al., Trade and Carbon Taxes, 100 AM. ECON. 
REV. 465 (2010). Whether carbon leakage could result between states has not been studied. 
 131. See BRYNER & DUFFY, supra note 114, at 122 (“In addition, the environmental 
costs of developing and deploying renewable energy sources must be determined through 
life-cycle analyses so the true costs and benefits of alternatives can be compared. In addi-
tion to working through the challenges facing the development of each kind of renewable 
energy source, there are some crosscutting issues that must also be integrated. Two brief 
examples—securing sufficient capacity in transmission lines and energy technology re-
search and development—illustrate some of these challenges.”). 
 132. A similar concession has been suggested for use with British Columbia’s carbon 
tax. See British Columbia Carbon Tax Review, 2012 TAX EXECUTIVE 393, 394 [hereinafter 
B.C. Tax Review], available at http://www.tei.org/news/articles/Documents/TTE_ 
SO12_Sub_BCCTR.pdf (“Thus, TEI urges the Government of British Columbia to dedicate 
a portion of the revenues generated by the Carbon Tax to programs that encourage invest-
ment by businesses in clean technologies. These programs would provide a direct link be-
tween the Carbon Tax and efforts by industry to reduce GHG emissions. Examples of these 
incentives include investment tax credits for purchases of machinery and equipment pow-
ered by alternative fuels, PST exemptions, accelerated depreciation, Carbon Tax allowanc-
es, and other specifically targeted measures designed to encourage capital investments in 
cleaner technologies.”). 
 133. See G. CORNELIS VAN KOOTEN, CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS: WHY 
INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS FAIL 30-31 (2004). 
 134. Id. See generally ECONOMIC MODELLING OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY 
POLICIES (Carlos De Miguel et al. eds., 2006) (modeling emissions reductions as a result of 
the EU trading scheme, which is a tradable system, not auction-based, in Spain). 
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C.   A Multi-State Carbon Tax and Determining the Social Cost of Harm 
A carbon tax can be scaled for a single state, a local province, a 
whole nation, or the entire international community.135 Therefore, 
were Florida to implement a carbon tax, it could later integrate 
seamlessly with other states’,136 then British Columbia’s,137 and final-
ly—other countries’ taxes.138 In fact, revenue raised among multiple 
countries instituting a carbon tax can be used to offset the regressive 
effects of the tax on poorer, developing countries.139 The purpose of a 
carbon tax is to put a price on the amount of harm caused by GHGs 
(otherwise called a Pigouvian tax).140 Considering that the EPA has 
calculated the socioeconomic cost of GHGs to be $39 per ton of emis-
sions in 2015, based on a 3% discount rate,141 that cost should be 
adopted by Florida and other states. Additionally, implementing a 
carbon tax based on that cost would indicate to consumers the eco-
nomic and social cost of emitting GHGs.142 
                                                                                                                                       
 135. See HSU, supra note 109, at 25. 
 136. As stated before, the CPP foresees and allows multi-state approaches. See Emis-
sions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,834, 34,836-37, 34,851. 
 137. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40 (Can.). 
 138. See HSU, supra note 109, at 46 (acknowledging the difficulty in demarcating the 
limits of federal and state jurisdiction when concurrently regulating GHGs); see also 
SUMNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 8 (listing the various existing and proposed carbon taxes 
around the world). 
 139. NORDHAUS, supra note 125, at 157-61. 
 140. HSU, supra note 109, at 27. 
 141. EPA, THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON (2013), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html. The cost of carbon varies widely based on 
the discount rate, i.e., the rate at which paying an amount now will later be worth more. 
NORDHAUS, supra note 125, at 76. The EPA utilized the 3% discount rate in the CPP be-
cause the EPA believed it reflected the preference of most people to have money now rather 
than in the future. See Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,839. But see NICHOLAS 
STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 52-53, 183-85 (2007) 
(finding the discount rate to be 1.4% based off (elasticity of the marginal utility of con-
sumption [1]) x (rate of economic growth [1.3]) + (decreasing rate of possibility of extinction 
[0.1])). For instance, most people would prefer to have more money now because of inflation 
or because you might die, you may have problems with delayed gratification, or you could 
invest in something right now.  
 142. See BRYNER & DUFFY, supra note 114, at 58-59; Marc B. Mihaly, Recovery of a Lost 
Decade (or Is It Three?): Developing the Capacity in Government Necessary to Reduce Car-
bon Emissions and Administer Energy Markets, 88 OR. L. REV. 405, 415 n.34 (2009); see 
also BRYNER & DUFFY, supra note 114, at 88 (discussing how a carbon tax would increase 
the competitiveness of nuclear power); HSU, supra note 109, at 34. Additionally, if Florida 
focused more on taxing carbon, as opposed to funding specific renewable technologies, there 
would be less of a concern with “rent seeking.” See id. at 54-58; Dieter Helm, Government 
Failure, Rent-Seeking, and Capture: The Design of Climate Change Policy, 26 OXFORD REV. 
ECON. POL’Y 182, 186 (2010). Rent seeking is also possible, if not made worse, by a cap-and-
trade system. See HSU, supra note 109, at 61. Because the carbon tax would only apply to 
fossil fuel-fired EGUs, it should contain no exemptions, unless an EGU implements carbon 
capture technology. However, Florida, like the rest of the United States, is decades away 
from commercial application of carbon capture technology. 




However, because emitters currently do not consider the harm of 
emitting GHGs, any amount of a carbon tax would be economically 
efficient.143 Even a modestly calculated cost of emissions would be 
economically efficient to the extent it sends a price signal where one 
otherwise would not be sent. Additionally, one of the other ad-
vantages of a carbon tax––that it can be instituted in tandem with 
other policies144––can help ensure that any unquantified harm would 
be otherwise ameliorated through another regulatory scheme. As 
stated earlier, the CPP requires states to implement direct emission 
limitations to EGUs. The command-and-control aspect of a state’s 
plan could be the adequate margin of safety to ensure that any error 
in calculating the cost of carbon would not render the tax ineffective. 
Therefore, Florida could adopt the cost of carbon quantified by 
Nordhaus at about $7.50/ton of CO2145 and attempt to capture the 
remaining harm through command-and-control regulation and other 
portfolio measures (assuming they are amended to be effective). Al-
ternatively, Florida could attempt to capture the vast quantity of the 
harm by adopting the Stern Review quantity of $85/ton of CO2.146 
However, predominately using the carbon tax to capture the harm 
would negate one of the main benefits of a carbon tax: that it can be 
implemented among multiple regulatory tools.147 Additionally, it 
would negate the flexibility afforded to Florida and other states by 
the CPP: the flexibility to implement multiple policy tools, both direct 
and indirect.148 For that reason, it would be more efficient to adopt 
the middle-ground price adopted by the EPA: $39/ton of CO2149 and 
capture any additional harm through energy efficiency and renewa-
ble energy sources but also require direct emission limitations as a 
safety net (and because it is required). Adopting the EPA’s model 
should also facilitate the plan review process.150   
                                                                                                                                       
 143. See HSU, supra note 109, at 29. 
 144. See discussion supra Part VI.A. 
 145. See NORDHAUS, supra note 125, at 90. 
 146. See STERN, supra note 141, at 344, 590-91. 
 147. See HSU, supra note 109, at 46. 
 148. See id.; SUMNER ET AL., supra note 14, at 22. 
 149. See sources cited supra note 141. 
 150. The EPA may conditionally approve SIPs (and by reference § 111(d) plans) so long 
as a state makes EPA-required changes by the statutory deadline: within one year of mak-
ing a completeness finding. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(4) (2012). However, the EPA only has with-
in sixty days of receiving a SIP to make its determination of completeness. Id. § 7410(k)(1). 
The Court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA held that the EPA, when condi-
tionally approving a SIP, cannot suspend the one-year deadline a state has in which to 
make the required changes to its SIP. 22 F.3d 1125, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Furthermore, 
the EPA cannot conditionally approve SIPs that, absent any substantive remedial 
measures, only contain a commitment by the state to implement changes within a year. Id. 
at 1133-35. In short, the SIP has to be in a “regulatory” form. Zacaroli, supra note 106, at 
47. While the holding of Natural Resources Defense Council extended only to inspection and 
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D.   Carbon Tax Compatibility with Command-and-Control 
 Regulation 
As stated before, the CPP will require Florida and other states to 
adopt direct emission limitations, which can be accomplished through 
traditional command-and-control regulation. Normally, the adoption 
of command-and-control regulations can conflict with a carbon tax 
because it sends uneven price signals.151 However, this is predomi-
nately the case when command-and-control regulations apply to dif-
ferent industries. In the case of the CPP, the command-and-control 
aspect would only be applied to existing stationary EGUs. Therefore, 
any uneven price signaling should be minimized. The combination of 
a command-and-control requirement in the form of a “cap” and a car-
bon tax can be referred to as a “cap-and-tax.”152  
The cap-and-tax system would share some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of the two polar cases. It would not have firm 
quantitative limits like a pure cap-and-trade system, but the quan-
titative limits would guide firms and countries and would give 
some confidence that the climatic targets were being achieved. The 
hybrid would have some but not all of the advantages of a carbon-
tax system. It would have more favorable public-finance character-
istics, it would reduce price volatility, it would mitigate the incen-
tives for corruption, and it would help deal with uncertainties. The 
narrower the band between the tax and the safety-valve price, the 
more it has the advantages of a carbon tax; the wider the band, the 
more it has the advantages of a cap-and-trade system.153 
VII.   IMPLEMENTING A CARBON TAX IN FLORIDA 
Fuel taxes are currently levied on natural gas and other petrole-
um products when imported into or produced from Florida.154 Coal, 
however, is not taxed.155 A new bill created a taxing scheme for natu-
ral gas when used as a motor fuel;156 but, the taxes do not take effect 
until January 1, 2019. Therefore, natural gas, when used as a motor 
                                                                                                                                       
maintenance plans within SIPs, the EPA has interpreted the case to apply to all elements 
of a SIP. Id. The EPA will only consider SIPs complete if at least 80% of the commitments 
are in regulatory form. Id. 
 151. See HSU, supra note 109, at 34. 
 152. See NORDHAUS, supra note 125, at 162-64. 
 153. Id. at 164. 
 154. FLA. STAT. §§ 206.9935-.9955 (2014). These taxes are levied to protect the coast. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See H.R. 579, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (creating Part V of Chapter 206, 
Fla. Stat.); FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, LAW CHANGES AFFECTING NATURAL GAS FUEL  
RETAILERS (2013), available at https://revenuelaw.state.fl.us/LawLibraryDocuments/ 
2013/11/TIP-117834_TIP%2013B05-04%20Natural%20Gas%20Fuel%20Retailers%20% 
20TIP%20FINAL2.pdf. 




vehicle fuel, is exempt from those fuel taxes for five years.157 The fuel 
exemption is meant to facilitate the conversion of vehicles from using 
gasoline as a fuel to using natural gas as a fuel.158 The bill subsidizes 
the conversion by creating a rebate program.159 
The simplest way to implement a carbon tax would be to amend 
the tax applying to all petroleum products so it would also include 
coal and to increase the tax to reduce emissions based on economic 
modeling.160 The tax applying to natural gas used as motor vehicle 
fuel should remain unaffected because motor vehicle emissions are 
not included in the CPP; they are regulated under the CAA mobile 
source program.161 Natural gas, when it is imported through the pipe-
lines, is used for both stationary and mobile sources. Taxing at the 
point of import may incidentally lead to taxation of natural gas to be 
used for mobile sources. Therefore, taxing should take place at the 
actual source: the EGU. 
Florida’s carbon tax program could tax fuels based on the relative 
amount of carbon in each type of fuel, which is what British Colum-
bia (B.C.) does.162 B.C.’s carbon tax makes the tax payable upon pur-
chase or final use of fuel.163 Additionally, B.C. makes the tax payable 
upon importation as well, but the tax is the same regardless.164 Bas-
ing the tax on carbon content would also have the beneficial effect of 
incentivizing the use of lower carbon content fossil fuels, in addition 
                                                                                                                                       
 157. See H.R. 579. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. On the matter of how to incorporate a carbon tax into existing fuel taxes, consider 
this approach: 
  One approach would be to calculate the next taxation of carbon fuels, includ-
ing all [existing] taxes and subsidies on energy products, but not to go beyond 
this to indirect, embodied impacts outside exceptional cases. . . . There would of 
course be many technical issues, such as how to convert energy taxes into their 
carbon equivalent. Some of the calculations involve conversion ratios (from coal 
or oil to carbon equivalent) that underpin any control system. Others require 
input-output coefficients, which might not be universally available on a timely 
basis. On the whole calculations of effective carbon-tax rates are straightfor-
ward as long as they do not involve indirect or embodied emissions. 
NORDHAUS, supra note 125, at 161-62. The level of the tax depends on the socio-
economic cost of carbon. See HSU, supra note 109, at 27-28. The different availa-
ble costs are discussed infra Part VI. 
 161. Mobile GHG Rule, supra note 22. The new limitations, announced under Presi-
dent Obama’s National Fuel Efficiency Policy, will lower emissions by setting minimum 
fuel efficiency standards, which should reach 35.5 MpG in 2016 for light-duty vehicles. Id.; 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A), (B) (2012). 
 162. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40 (Can.). A bill was introduced in the U.S. Con-
gress in 2007 that would have taxed coal, oil, and natural gas based on the carbon content 
of those fuels. Save Our Climate Act of 2011, H.R. 3242, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 163. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, pt. 3 (Can.). 
 164. Id. § 10. 
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to reducing overall fossil fuel consumption.165 Alternatively, the emis-
sions themselves could be taxed, incentivizing the use of technology 
to reduce and trap emissions. However, currently the only method, 
with commercial application, of reducing emissions from coal at exist-
ing EGUs is to lower the heat rate at which coal is burned.166 As stat-
ed before, heat rate improvements are the first building block of the 
BSER and, by the EPA’s estimates, are only capable of reducing 
emissions by 6%.167 The 6% reduction by heat rate improvements 
would likely be absorbed by the direct emission limitations required 
under the CPP.168 Furthermore, heat rate improvements have been 
found to be the BSER for reconstructed and heavily modified EGUs 
under 111(b).169 Therefore, taxing emissions would have almost the 
same effect as taxing carbon content, at least for now. In the future, 
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology could be im-
proved and implemented on a wide, commercial scale.170 For instance, 
a new pilot plant has endeavored to begin capturing CO2 as early as 
next year for a period of six months.171 Whereas most CCS technolo-
gies capture CO2 at the point of release, this plant will remove it di-
rectly from the ambient air.172 To incentivize the continued develop-
ment of CCS technology, emissions should be taxed at the source:  
the EGU.  
                                                                                                                                       
 165. See HSU, supra note 109, at 65-76. 
 166. See HASLER, supra note 68. Current studies estimate that heat rate improvements 
could reduce emissions from a range of less than 5% to greater than 15%. EPA V5.13 BASE 
CASE DOCUMENTATION APPENDIX: HEAT RATE IMPROVEMENT OPTION, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/documents/ipm/HRI%20Appendix.pdf. Under the CPP, the 
EPA estimates heat rate improvements, on average, can reduce emissions by 6%. EPA 
BASE SUPPLEMENT, supra note 68. 
 167. See Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,851; EPA BASE SUPPLEMENT, supra 
note 68; see also sources cited supra note 68. 
 168. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,835. 
 169. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430, 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014) [herein-
after Standards]. 
 170. See generally Steven Chu, Carbon Capture and Sequestration, 325 SCI. 1599, 1599 
(2009) (addressing the need to develop carbon capture and sequestration technology); John 
Pendergrass et al., Carbon Capture and Sequestration in Practice, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,471 
(2010). Carbon capture and sequestration technology was also the BSER for the section 
111(b) rule for new sources. Standards, supra note 169. 
 171. See Joshua Learn, Pilot Plant Will Begin Sucking CO2 from Thin Air Early Next 
Year, E&E REP. (Nov. 4, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2014/11/04/stories/ 
1060008319 (“[T]he machine will suck 550 to 1,100 tons of CO2 out of the atmosphere every 
year, roughly equivalent to the emissions of 150 cars at maximum capacity. But it’s only a 
small fraction of the 550,000 to 1 million tons the company will need to remove to make a 
larger plant commercially feasible on the carbon credit market in California and other 
places as they develop.”). 
 172. See id. (“It involves repurposed cooling tower technology that captures CO2 into a 
chemical solution. With technology borrowed from water treatment plants, this solution is 
then converted into calcium carbonate pellets. These pellets are heated back up in a lime 
kiln and release pure CO2, which is then captured.”). 




A.   Addressing Regressiveness 
Florida should model B.C.’s tax to the extent that it ensures the 
government does not profit from the taxes.173 B.C. government reduc-
es income and corporate taxes each time it increases the tax.174 As 
designed, the tax increases each year,175 so income and corporate tax-
es have decreased each year as well.176 In deciding how to appropriate 
the tax after collection, states have multiple options177: 
1. Budget deficit reduction;178 
2. Distribute it as a lump sum to each household;179 
3. Reduce personal income taxes;180 and 
4. Reduce corporate income taxes.181 
The first option would not be revenue-neutral and would most 
likely make the prospect of a carbon tax even harder to digest, politi-
cally. The second option could be traditionally economical in the 
sense that people receiving money tend to spend it, therefore stimu-
lating the economy.182 The last two options, together, have worked 
well for B.C.183 However, Florida does not have a personal income tax. 
                                                                                                                                       
 173. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, § 2(2) (Can.) (“In this Part, the carbon tax is 
revenue neutral if the dollar amount of the carbon tax collected in a fiscal year is less than 
or equal to the estimated dollar amount of the reduction in Provincial revenues in the same 
fiscal year as a result of revenue measures.”). 
 174. See B.C. Tax Review, supra note 132; Ross Beaty et al., The Shocking Truth About 
B.C.’s Carbon Tax: It Works, THE GLOBE & MAIL (July 9, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-insidious-truth-about-bcs-carbon-tax-it-
works/article19512237/. 
 175. See Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, sched. 1 (Can.) (noting that the different 
prices of taxes are based on a flat rate of carbon content, starting with $10 a ton in 2008). 
 176. P.F., British Columbia’s Carbon Tax: The Evidence Mounts, ECONOMIST  
(July 31, 2014, 12:55), http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/07/british-
columbias-carbon-tax; see also Beaty et al., supra note 174. 
 177. For a more exhaustive list of distributive options, see Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. et 
al., Incentive-Based Approaches to Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in Pennsylvania: Protecting 
the Environment and Promoting Fiscal Reform, 14 WIDENER L.J. 205, 219 (2004). 
 178. See Adam Rose, Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Action Planning: An Overview, 12 
PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 153, 164 (2004). 
 179. Glenn Wiser, Joint Implementation: Incentives for Private Sector Mitigation of 
Global Climate Change, 9 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 747, 761 (1997). 
 180. See Rose, supra note 178, at 164. 
 181. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf, Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 63 (2009); Rose, supra note 178, at 164. 
 182. The Cantwell-Collins bill was a cap-and-trade bill that sought to recycle revenues 
back to households with lump sum payments as well. Carbon Limits and Energy for Amer-
ica’s Renewal (CLEAR) Act, S. 2877, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009).  
 183. See B.C. Tax Review, supra note 132; Kathryn Harrison, The Political Economy of 
British Columbia’s Carbon Tax 10 (OECD Env’t Working Paper No. 63, 2013),  
available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment-and-sustainable-development/the-
political-economy-of-british-columbia-s-carbon-tax_5k3z04gkkhkg-en; Beaty et al., supra  
note 174. 
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Florida would not be able to perfectly emulate B.C., but it could re-
duce corporate income taxes instead. In fact, reducing corporate in-
come taxes has been shown to best stimulate the economy.184 Fur-
thermore, reductions in the corporate income tax rate would be in-
corporated into the electrical utility rate of $/MWh,185 that is, a re-
duction in the corporate income rate would cause the utility to incur 
fewer expenses. Lowering the corporate income tax would stimulate 
the economy and make fiscal conservatives more likely to support a 
carbon tax.186  
A tax has a regressive effect when it burdens those individuals 
with less ability to pay more than those individuals with a greater 
ability to pay. In other words, the burden increases as ability-to-pay 
decreases. In practice, a carbon tax, because it would equally affect 
all household users of power, would be more costly for lower-income 
individuals because electricity use takes up a larger fraction of their 
budget.187 Therefore, a carbon tax would be regressive despite that it 
would be written as a flat rate. Although, some studies have shown 
that federal bills assigning a price to carbon, like different cap-and-
trade bills, can alleviate the regressive effects of the price through 
revenue redistribution,188 in the manners described above.189 The sim-
ilarities between a carbon tax and cap-and-trade are significant for 
this purpose because they both send price signals and require the 
utility to incur costs.  Regressiveness can be alleviated to some extent 
by levying the tax on the EGU, as opposed to the end-user of pow-
er.190 There were greater concerns with the B.C. carbon tax regres-
siveness because gasoline users would pay the tax at the pump.191 
                                                                                                                                       
 184. See Francesco Bosello et al., The Double Dividend Issue: Modeling Strategies and 
Empirical Findings, 6 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 9, 9-11 (2001); McKinstry et al., supra note 177, 
at 225-26. 
 185. See Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis, 289 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1974) (requiring that rate-
making account for the increase in the corporate tax rate). 
 186. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Corporate Tax Reform: Paying the Bills with a Carbon Tax, 
35 PUB. FIN. REV. 440, 456 (2007). 
 187. HSU, supra note 109, at 124. 
 188. Sebastian Rausch et al., Distributional Implications of Alternative U.S. Green-
house Gas Control Measures 39-41 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
16053, 2010). See generally Ian A. MacKenzie & Markus Ohndorf, Cap-and-trade, Taxes, 
and Distributional Conflict, 63 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 51 (2012) (finding that the extent 
of revenue recycling needed to mitigate tax regressiveness depends on numerous factors 
and that in some situations no revenue recycling is optimal). 
 189. See supra notes 178-83. See generally McKinstry et al., supra note 177, at 219 
(discussing a wider variety of revenue recycling options). 
 190. Cf. McKinstry et al., supra note 177, at 135 (discussing how a study found that 
carbon pricing bills have a greater regressive effect on the generators of power themselves, 
even when the price is paid by the final user of power). If those prices have a greater re-
gressive effect on the industry, then a tax that is levied on the industry directly should 
further insulate the regressive effect from the final user of power. Id.  
 191. Carbon Tax Act, S.B.C. 2008, c. 40, § 11 (Can.); Chris Mooney, British Columbia 
Enacted the Most Significant Carbon Tax in the Western Hemisphere. What Happened Next 




Despite those concerns, the carbon tax in B.C. has been heralded as a 
success.192 If the B.C. carbon tax, which had a wider range of fuel 
sources and a more direct impact on end-users of power, was success-
ful, then the narrower and less direct Florida carbon tax should be 
just as successful—if not more so. However, the tax could still be re-
gressive if utility companies raise their rates to recoup the costs of a 
carbon tax.  Utilities in Florida are regulated by the FPSC, which has 
to approve any rate increases in Florida.193 The second option de-
scribed above, distributing a lump sum payment, could make the tax 
progressive instead of regressive.194 A tax is progressive when the 
rate/burden increases as a taxpayer’s ability to pay increases. The 
level of progressiveness of the tax would have to depend on to whom 
the lump sum goes, and how much. Should it be scaled by income 
level? Or electricity use compared to income level? As callous as it 
sounds, it may be better to distribute a lump sum payment inde-
pendent of electricity usage because conditioning payment on a large 
use of electricity relevant to income would discourage energy  
efficiency.   
In determining the rate electrical utilities should charge custom-
ers, the FPSC utilizes the formula: R = O + (V-D)r, that is, the reve-
nue earned by a utility must equal its operating costs plus the quan-
tity of the allowed rate of return multiplied by the quantity of gross 
value of tangible and intangible property minus the accrued depreci-
ation of property.195 When a utility petitions for a rate increase, it will 
have the opportunity to include the cost of the carbon tax in its oper-
ating costs.196 However, other factors will also apply. For instance, 
these utilities will likely utilize renewable energy sources to meet 
any direct emission limitations prescribed by the Florida Department 
of Environmental Protection and the EPA. These renewable energy 
sources will be accompanied with federal government subsidies to 
lower costs.197 Furthermore, despite the expiration of the solar rebate 
                                                                                                                                       
Is It Worked., MOTHER JONES (Mar. 26, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
environment/2014/03/british-columbia-carbon-tax-sanity. 
 192. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 183. 
 193. FLA. STAT. § 366.07 (2014); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-6.0425 (2014). 
 194. See Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Mouez Fodha, From Regressive Pollution Taxes 
to Progressive Environmental Tax Reforms, 69 EUR. ECON. REV. 126 (2014). 
 195. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 182-83 
(2d ed. 2011). 
 196. Cf. Jane Andrew et al., Carbon Tax: Challenging Neoliberal Solutions to Climate 
Change, 21 CRITICAL PERSP. ON ACCT. 611, 615 (2010) (finding that utilities had included 
the cost of participating in the SO2 cap-and-trade system in their operating expenses). 
 197. See Federal Incentives/Policies for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, 
DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (DSIRE),  
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program?state=US (last visited May 5, 2015) (listing 
all of the renewable energy programs and tax incentives at the federal level as well as all of 
the energy efficiency programs and tax incentives at the federal level). The same can be 
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program, other renewable energy incentives exist.198 In setting rates, 
the FPSC must account for taxes that will affect future rates, but this 
should include both the carbon tax and any tax breaks that result 
from investing in renewables.199 Furthermore, assuming that the to-
tal amount of the tax as applied to the total amount of fossil fuels will 
be passed onto consumers misunderstands the intent of the carbon 
tax. The tax is intended to capture the cost of carbon in a way that 
reduces emissions at a cost comparable to the benefit of reducing 
emissions.200 If the amount of the tax is appropriate, then consump-
tion of fossil fuels by EGUs will decrease in an economically efficient 
manner. Then, overtime, the utilities can substitute the use of fossil 
fuels with renewables. In fact, the EPA has projected that residential 
electricity bills will decline by 9% in 2030 due to energy efficiency 
measures.201 Additionally, the legislature could amend FEECA to 
provide for an energy efficiency tax holiday. For instance, for a whole 
year residents could receive a sales tax rebate or exemption on pur-
chases of certain energy efficient products. That way, Florida could 
not only include the emissions reduced as a result of the tax holiday 
in its plan but also help alleviate the regressive effects of the  
carbon tax.  
 Lastly, rate increases do not occur in a vacuum. There is an ex-
tensive process that allows for extensive public involvement. Before 
setting a new rate, the Public Service Commission must hold a public 
hearing in the electrical utility’s sector.202 At the hearing, all inter-
ested members of the public have the opportunity to present com-
ments, concerns, and ask questions.203 Furthermore, the legislature 
appoints a Public Counsel to represent the public at the public hear-
                                                                                                                                       
said of end-users of power who utilize energy efficiency programs. See Florida Incen-
tives/Policies for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES 
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY (DSIRE), http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program? 
state=FL (last visited May 5, 2015) (listing all of the energy efficiency programs and tax 
incentives at the state level). 
 198. See Florida Incentives/Policies for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, supra 
note 197. 
 199. See Gulf Power Co. v. Bevis, 289 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 1974) (requiring that rate-
making account for the increase in the corporate tax rate). 
 200. See HSU, supra note 109, at 65-76. In other words:  
[T]he key aim of climate-change policy should be to ensure that those generat-
ing GHGs . . . face a marginal cost of emissions that reflects the damage they 
cause. This encourages emitters to invest in alternative, low-carbon technolo-
gies, and consumers of GHG-intensive goods and services to change their 
spending patterns in response to the increase in relative prices.  
STERN, supra note 141, at 353.  
 201. Emissions Guidelines, supra note 1, at 34,934; EPA FAQ, supra note 2, at 18. 
 202. FLA. STAT. § 366.06(2) (2014). 
 203. See Overview and Key Facts, FLA. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, http://www.psc.state.fl.us/ 
about/overview.aspx (last visited May 5, 2015) [hereinafter FPSC, Key Facts]. 




ings.204 After the public hearings, the Public Service Commission 
holds a technical hearing where they hear arguments from technical 
experts.205 The Public Counsel also represents the public at the tech-
nical hearing.206 Finally, a last option is to actually amend the way 
rates are determined. The statute could be amended to prevent the full 
cost of complying with Florida’s plan to be passed onto ratepayers. 207 
Regardless of all of the possible solutions to the regressiveness of a 
carbon tax, regressiveness is not unique to a carbon tax. For in-
stance, were an emissions limit simply applied to utilities, that limit 
would be accompanied with a cost that would make its way into the 
rate base described above. The same would be true of the cost of cap-
ping emissions under a cap-and-trade scheme. The focus then should 
not be on the regressiveness of the various performance standards 
but on how best to reduce the effects of regressiveness on ratepayers. 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
The Clean Power Plan will satisfy President Obama’s commitment 
to reduce U.S. emissions. But, in using section 111(d), the EPA will 
have to rely on states to implement policies to reach the emissions 
goals. The policies that states may implement should drive EGUs to 
utilize the technologies and methods the EPA has determined are the 
BSER. The CPP provides states considerable flexibility in the policies 
they may choose: encapsulating either direct emission limitations or 
direct emission limitations and a portfolio of indirect emissions  
reduction programs.  
One such program Florida can and should implement is a carbon 
tax. Both 111(d) and the CPP support a carbon tax as one of the port-
folio policies to indirectly reduce emissions. Considering the FPSC’s 
recent decision to end the solar rebate program and to significantly 
reduce energy efficiency goals, a carbon tax may be the sole method 
Florida has to reduce emissions indirectly, initially. And when the 
energy efficiency goals are revised again to be effective at reducing 
emissions, they can co-exist with a carbon tax. A carbon tax is also 
better suited to reduce emissions than a cap-and-trade program be-
cause of the system set in place by the CPP. Fuel taxes already levied 
on natural gas in Florida also support the implementation of a  
carbon tax.  
                                                                                                                                       
 204. FLA. STAT. § 350.0611(1) (2014). 
 205. See FPSC, Key Facts, supra note 203. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Whealdon, supra note 16, at 13 (proposing a construction of the tax that would 
alleviate the concern of social scientists who believe a carbon tax would be regressive). 
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However, regressiveness is an actual, concrete negative effect a 
tax imposes on society. But any control measure is likely to be re-
gressive, and FPSC rate-setting policies should help ensure that a 
rate is reasonably set. Additionally, if the FPSC reform bill gains 
ground and passes, that should also help alleviate industry pressure 
during ratemaking proceedings. Carbon tax revenue can be recycled 
to help alleviate regressive effects. British Columbia has utilized this 
option as a way to stimulate its economy as well. Lastly, in part be-
cause of energy efficiency measures, the EPA foresees a drop in elec-
trical rates by 2030. However, the most compelling reason to imple-
ment a carbon tax may be the great success B.C. has had in reducing 
emissions: a 9.9% decline in emissions in two years.208 
                                                                                                                                       
 208. SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY, supra note 12, at 12. 
